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WHYTHECANONSHOULDBE 
EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE INSULAR 
CASES AND THE SAGA OF AMERICAN 
EXPANSIONISM* 
Sanford Levinson** 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE "CANON" 
All disciplines are constituted by their canons- that series 
of "set texts" that comprises the core materials of any given aca-
demic area. As Jack Balkin and I have written elsewhere, de-
bates about the canon are rife in many contemporary disciplines, 
most notably, perhaps (at least in terms of public attention), in 
English and American literature, but most certainly including le-
gal studies.1 One can ask very generally what legal materials all 
law students should be exposed to, or one can ask the more lim-
ited question as to what students studying constitutional law 
should be expected to read. That is, what should constitute the 
canon of constitutional law? 
Even this way of putting the question may be too broad, 
though, for we argue that one cannot begin constructing a set of 
* Material drawn from this essay will appear in the forthcoming book from Duke 
University Pre~, Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, eds., Foreign in A Do-
mestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution. This book is a 
treasure trove of essays written by people far more expert about Puerto Rico than I am, 
and anyone persuaded by this essay as to importance of The Insular Cases and of con-
tinuing constitutional conundrums concerning Puerto Rico should certainly consult the 
book when it appears. 
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas Law School. I am grateful to Scot Powe and Fred Schauer for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this essay, as well as to Larry Sager and Chris Eisgruber 
for inviting me to present it to their constitutional theory colloquium at the New York 
University School of Law and for their extremely probing comments. An earlier version 
was also distributed to members of the "Georgetown schmooze" convened by Mark 
Tushnet in December 1999. 
1. See J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1998). I have also examined one subset of the canon in Slavery in the 
Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1087 (1993). 
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canonical materials without first addressing the purpose of the 
proposed canon. Is it, for example, to teach students within the 
legal academy those cases (and other materials) most likely to 
structure their own practice of constitutional law, assuming, con-
trary to fact, of course, that many-let alone most-students will 
ever find themselves litigating a constitutional issue? Still, one 
could begin with the "legal fiction" that students must be aware 
of the most lively issues currently before courts and of the vari-
ous doctrines likely to prove interesting (or at least useful) to 
adjudicators called upon to decide cases involving those issues. 
Or, again focusing on the specific needs of students preparing to 
become practicing lawyers, should we pick materials that are es-
pecially useful in teaching the arts of lawyering, i.e., those cases 
that offer especially useful examples of legal reasoning that can 
serve as models of the lawyers' rhetorical arts? Even cases in-
volving no-longer-live issues could, nonetheless, serve as para-
digms of such reasoning.2 Both of these criteria, whatever their 
differences, involve candidates for what we call the "pedagogical 
canon,"
3 i.e., the preparation of students for their professional 
lives as practicing lawyers. 
But one might have aims other than preparing persons, even 
those persons called "law students," for the actual practice of 
constitutionallaw.4 After all, many undergraduate and graduate 
students take courses in constitutional law without intending to 
become lawyers. Indeed, some law students even attend law 
2. I should note that "useful" does not necessarily mean "admirable." One might, 
of course, select canonical cases on the basis of their admirability as exercises in legal 
reasoning. This is one rationale, for example, for teaching Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which includes what I regard as the greatest single 
opinion ever written by a Supreme Court justice, Robert Jackson's concurrence in that 
case, id. at 634. See Sanford Levinson, Introduction [to Favorite Case Symposium]: Why 
Select a Favorite Case? 74 Texas L. Rev. 1195, 1197-1200 (1996). Obviously, the issue of 
"inherent" presidential power could arise again in our own time, but, just as obviously, 
this is not at the forefront of contemporary constitutional controversy, and the rationale 
for including it within the canon would be something other than preparing students for 
the most likely subjects of litigation. 
3. Balkin and Levinson, 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 975 (cited in note 1). During there-
cent impeachment brouhaha, it might have been useful if the ordinary lawyer knew more 
about presidential impeachment than is likely to be the case. The reason surely is not the 
empirical likelihood of any given lawyer being asked to represent the President or his 
adversaries, but, rather, the joint propensities of non-lawyers to ask lawyers about the 
legal merits of impeachment and of lawyers to answer such questions, whether or not 
they are truly knowledgeable about the matter. 
4. Which, perhaps, suggests that the term "vocational canon" would be more pre-
cise than "pedagogical canon" insofar as any canon taught to students is, by virtue of that 
fact, a "pedagogical" one, but, of course, the content of canons could differ substantially 
based on the purposes of the teacher. 
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school without envisioning themselves as future legal practitio-
ners. Yet all may well view some familiarity with the materials 
of American constitutional development as part of what consti-
tutes their being educated citizens. And "official" lawyers may 
see themselves (and are often treated as) charged with the spe-
cial task of serving as "delegates" of a sort from the particular 
world of law to lay outsiders, as when they are asked to give 
"Law Day" speeches to local schools or, more commonly, to 
opine at dinner parties about the propriety of what the Supreme 
Court is doing these days. Their teachers are thus charged with 
the task of identifying the canon of such materials. We label this 
the "cultural literacy canon."5 
Finally, there is what we denominate the "academic theory 
canon," by which we identify those crucial episodes within 
American constitutional history that must be confronted by legal 
academics who wish to be taken seriously within the community 
of constitutional scholars.6 Here, one is not at all concerned with 
what is best for one's students, treated either as pre-
professionals or future citizens, but, rather, what is best for one-
self as someone who wishes to establish his or her presence 
within an ongoing conversation among trained academics. 
I want to argue that The Insular Case/ deserve an impor-
tant place within each of these canons, though, as one might ex-
pect, the reasons are different depending on the canon to which 
one is referring. I should confess that I speak a bit with the zeal 
of a convert, for prior to an April, 1998, Yale Law School con-
ference on Puerto Rico that I attended, I had never read the 
cases.
8 Neither in my graduate studies at Harvard prior to writ-
5. Balkin and Levinson,l11 Harv. L. Rev. at 976 (cited in note 1). 
6. Id. 
7. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). This is, obviously, only one of the 
many cases that, taken together, comprise "the insular cases." Others decided the same 
Term include Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. 
United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huss v. N.Y. & P.R. Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 
222 (1901); and De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). See also Ocampo v. United States, 
234 U.S. 91 (1914); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Rassmussen v. United 
States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903). Most discussants of 
the cases seem to agree that Downes is the most significant single case. As shall be seen 
below, it certainly contains a treasure trove of issues for those interested in constitutional 
law and theory. A comprehensive treatment of the issues is Juan R. Torruella, The Su-
preme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal (1985). 
8. One might well wonder why I was invited to participate in the conference. One 
answer, I strongly suspect, is that its remarkable organizer, a law student from Puerto 
Rico, "went after" casebook editors-Mark Tushnet was another invitee-with the aim 
of educating us to the importance of the issue. She certainly succeeded in my case! 
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ing a dissertation on Justices Holmes and Frankfurter nor at the 
Stanford Law School, where I received my J.D., were they ever 
assigned; I have also managed to teach constitutional law for al-
most two decades at the University of Texas (and co-edit what I 
immodestly believe is a first-rate casebook in the field9) without 
filling in this blank. One factor encouraging this public confes-
sion is that conversation with other adepts in constitutional law, 
including editors of competing casebooks, leads me to believe 
that my story is not in the least unusual. 
At the present time, few cases can be said to be less canoni-
cal, regardless of criterion, than Downes (or any of the other In-
sular Cases). 10 Balkin and I present a practical test of what is, or 
is not, a canonical case: Just play the wonderful game, "Humilia-
tion," invented by the British novelist David Lodge as part of his 
academic novel Changing Places, in which one wins points by 
naming, in a group of presumably sophisticated fellow academ-
ics, books that one has not read that have, in fact, been read by 
the rest of the group. The "winner" of the game, in the novel, 
was a hapless, overly competitive, untenured professor of Eng-
lish who could not resist using Hamlet as his trump.11 The consti-
tutional law equivalent would presumably be the admission that 
one had never read McCulloch v. Maryland.12 Somewhere there 
may be a legal academic who has never pored through this most 
important of all constitutional law opinions, but one would truly 
risk one's reputation (and one's job) by admitting it. That is the 
operational test of a case's being canonical. The Insular Cases, 
on the other hand, might be taken, at least at the present time, as 
exemplifying the "anti-canon" (just as matter is complemented 
by anti-matter) insofar as no ostensible constitutional scholar 
risks sullying his or her reputation-save, presumably, in Puerto 
Rico itself!- by admitting to one's ignorance. 
9. Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes Of Constitutional Decisionmaking 
(Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1992). 
10. Obviously, there are many obscure cases that would be equally uncanonical. 
The difference between them and Downes is that it, and the other Insular Cases, were 
once at the center of American constitutional debate, whereas many cases are deservedly 
obscure insofar as no one really cared about them at the time (other than the particular 
litigants) or afterward. What has to be explained in regard to Downes and its companion 
cases is why an issue that was once deemed so vital to American constitutionalism has 
almost entirely disappeared from view. One cannot even take refuge in the answer that 
is sometimes given in regard to, say, the disappearance of many slavery cases from the 
canon-"we don't have slavery anymore"-because we most certainly do continue to 
have Puerto Rico as a live issue of American politics and constitutional inquiry. 
11. See David Lodge, Changing Places: A Tale of Two Campuses 136 (Penguin 
Books, 1992). He "won" the game, though, subsequently, was not awarded tenure. 
12. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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Evidence of this proposition can be found not only in per-
sonal anecdote. Just look at contemporary constitutional law 
casebooks or treatises, where one will find almost literally no 
mention at all of the cases. No casebook that I have examined 
has even the briefest reference to the cases and to the issues 
raised by them. One will search in vain for index entries to, say, 
"Puerto Rico," "territories," or "expansion." In addition to the 
"standard" constitutional law casebooks, I searched as well Der-
rick Bell's Race, Racism, and American Law, 13 inasmuch as one 
might well view The Insular Cases as central documents in the 
history of American racism. It was absent there as well. Indeed, 
the principal reason for my "almost" in the first sentence above 
is a two-page discussion, in John Nowak's and Ronald Rotunda's 
hornbook on constitutional law, of "To What Extent Does the 
Constitution Follow the Flag; Does the Constitution Apply to 
the Territories?" 14 Professor Laurence Tribe also cites Downes 
in the second edition of his magisterial American Constitutional 
Law, but it occurs at the conclusion of a single footnote con-
cerning congressional power over aliens.15 There was, as implied, 
no mention at all in the first edition, as is the case in the com-
peting treatise authored by Erwin Chemerinsky .16 The cases 
would never constitute an intelligent play in "Humiliation," as-
suming there is nothing truly unusual about the group within 
which one is playing (such as their being Puerto Ricans). 
It is more than time to change this situation. I have played 
my own part by adding a new section, "American Expansionism, 
Race, Ethnicity, and the Constitution," to the new edition of 
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, 11 including a 10-
page excerpt from Downes. My hope is that its inclusion will 
come to be regarded less as yet another idiosyncracy of our book 
(which, in the past, included taking seriously the Second 
Amendment), but, rather (as is perhaps occurring with the Sec-
ond Amendment), something to be emulated in our competitors 
as well. Perhaps I should mention as well that I have now taught 
Downes in introductory courses at both the University of Texas 
13. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 
1992). 
14. See John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 210-11 (West, 
5th ed. 1995). 
15. See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 361 n.41 (Foundation Press, 
2d ed. 1988). 
16. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (Aspen Law 
and Business, 1997). 
17. Brest and Levinson, Processes at 297-309 (cited in note 9). 
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and the New York University schools of law, sparking in both 
instances good discussions among students.18 Thinking about the 
issues raised in that case has also led me to offer, again for the 
first time, a seminar on "The Constitution and American Expan-
sion," a topic that is remarkably understudied by constitutional 
scholars, much to our detriment. 
II. WHAT CAN DOWNES v. BIDWELL TEACH? 
So let me now try to answer the central question: What jus-
tifies imposing upon students, especially first-year law students, 
even an edited version of a very, very long case dealing, at a 
formal level, with the meaning of Article I, § 8, clause 1 and its 
requirement that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States"? For those who have not 
read the decision, the conclusion of the Court, in two plurality 
opinions, is that Puerto Rico is not within "the United States" 
even though it is, as decided in another of the "Insular Cases, "19 
certainly not a "foreign country." Instead, it is a territory, and 
Congress has the power to regulate territorial tariffs in a way 
that would be absent were Puerto Rico a state. To reduce the 
case to its specific holding about a notably obscure clause of the 
Constitution is, however, to miss the forest for the trees: The im-
portance of the Cases did not lie in the particular resolution of 
tariff policy, but, rather, in deciding whether the United States 
could emulate the European nations and conquer and possess 
colonial territories. And what it meant to be such a territory-
the term that comes out of Downes is "unincorporated 
territory," in contrast to "incorporated territories" like, say, the 
Dakotas, Alaska, Hawaii, and the like-is, among other things, 
that there is simply no pretense that the colonized entity was 
being held in trust until, on the one hand, it could become 
independent or, on the other, until it was absorbed into the 
United States as an equal member of the federal Union, with 
whatever "sovereign" prerogatives continued to be possessed by 
the states. Territories do not even possess the fictive elements of 
18. I also note, for what it is worth, I do not assign Marbury v. Madison, because of 
my belief that it isn't worth taking the time necessary to teach it in a course in which 
many issues and cases compete with one another for time in a course that meets only 
forty-two times the entire semester. It is true, though, that I do assign Robert 
McOoskey, The American Supreme Court (U. of Chicago Press, 3d ed. 2000), the second 
chapter of which is a presentation of Marbury, so it is not the case that my students 
emerge completely ignorant about the importance, within our conversational legal cul-
ture, of the case. 
19. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). 
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do not even possess the fictive elements of "sovereignty" re-
tained by Indian tribes.20 
The answer to my question above surely doesn't lie in what 
undergirds the first version of the pedagogical canon, i.e., the 
high probability that students will be faced with "uniformity 
clause" issues. It is not self-evident what the relationship should 
be between likelihood of actual cases and presence in the peda-
gogical canon; after all, even though the field of taxation of in-
terstate commerce, especially by states, continues to generate 
significant cases/1 the general subject has disappeared from al-
most all contemporary casebooks. Whatever explains the pres-
ence (or absence) of cases in constitutional law case books, it is 
not likely to be a predictive judgment as to what precise areas 
are most likely to be of practical relevance to our students, most 
of whom will address a constitutional issue, if they ever do, in the 
course of representing a business-related client faced with a 
dormant commerce clause problem or, indeed, the taxation of 
interstate commerce. 
Nor am I really concerned to prepare students for possible 
cases concerning the particular (and perhaps peculiar) constitu-
tional status of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, 
though, to be sure, there is certainly opportunity for some law-
yers to litigate such issues.22 Again, though, if prediction of liti-
gation is at all relevant, one should note that it is far more likely 
that students will address in their practice the First Amendment 
implications of regulating cigarette advertising than whether, for 
example, Puerto Ricans are properly regarded as 14th Amend-
ment birthright citizens rather than citizens only because of con-
gressional grace as manifested in a 1917 statute conferring that 
status.23 
20. On retained Indian sovereignty, see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 
Pet.) 1 (1831). An excellent historical examination is Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's 
Case: American Indican Sovereignty, Trial LAw, and United States LAw in the Nineteenth 
Century (1994). The minimal nature of Indian sovereignty is underlined in United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), recognizing plenary power in Congress to do basically 
whatever it wished with regard to Indian tribes. 
21. See Nowak and Rotunda, Constitutional Law§ 8.11 at 311-14 (cited in note 14), 
for a recent overview of the caselaw. 
22. See generally Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis 
of United States Territorial Relations (Nijoff, 1989). The Court very recently summarily 
affirmed a decision of a three-judge district court holding that The Insular Cases are alive 
and well, with the consequence that the one-person-one-vote doctrine of Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), did not apply to the Northern Mariana Islands. See Torres v. 
Sablan, No. 99-475, 2000 WL 29242, 68 USLW 3178 (January 18, 2000) (affirming unre-
ported decision). 
23. See the Jones Act, Act of March 2, 1917, 39 Stat. 353, discussed in Leibowitz, 
248 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:241 
One could easily justify assigning Downes in terms of the 
second notion of the pedagogical canon, for the debates among 
the contending justices are indeed carried on at a high level of 
professional ability, and students can certainly learn a lot about 
legal rhetoric from the close study of the various opinions. For 
someone like me, who emphasizes in my course learning the 
"modalities" of legal argument,24 the case is almost a treasure 
trove. After all, the formal question before the Court is whether 
Puerto Rico, ceded to the United States by Spain in the after-
math of the Spanish-American War of 1898 and thus fully sub-
ject to American sovereignty, is within "the United States" for 
purposes of the uniformity Clause. One might think this would 
be an easy question, but students (and their teachers) are consis-
tently surprised by the fundamental questions that the Constitu-
tion leaves unanswered. Presidents must be "natural born citi-
zens, "
25 but the Constitutional text gives nary a clue as to how 
one discovers who is, with certainty, within that status.26 Simi-
larly, one might think that the question as to what constitutes 
"the United States" that is, after all, presumptively structured by 
the Constitution would have a clear constitutional answer, but 
that, just as obviously, is untrue. If Puerto Rico is not part of 
"the United States," then what (or where) is it, and how does 
one derive the answer? One answer is that offered by the plu-
rality opinion authored by Justice White, which has proved the 
"winning" opinion in subsequent cases. It is an "unincorporated 
territory," a term that, of course, appears nowhere in the consti-
tutional text or anywhere in the various debates surrounding the 
formation of the Constitution. So where does it come from? 
Perhaps from prior case law, as suggested in the plurality opin-
ion, though the very fact that it is only a plurality opinion sug-
Defining Status at 144-46 (cited in note 22). 
24. The term comes from Philip Bobbitt's seminal work. See Philip Bobbitt, Con-
stitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford U. Press, 1982); Constitutional Inter-
pretation (Basil Blackwell, 1991). For Bobbitt there are six "modalities," i.e., constitutive 
rhetorics of constitutional analysis: textualism, historical analysis, structuralism, doctri-
nalism, prudentialism, and what he calls "ethical" analysis, by which he means attention 
to the underlying assumptions of the American "ethos" captured in the overall nature of 
the constitutional enterprise. For further analysis (and critique), see J.M. Balkin and 
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1771 (1994). 
25. Art. II,§ I, cl. 5. 
26. And, as Jordan Steiker, Jack Balkin, and I have shown elsewhere, the presiden-
tial eligibility clause, if read extremely closely, has some very surprising consequences 
indeed. See Steiker, et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional 
Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 137 (1995) (dem-
onstrating, through careful textual analysis, the ineligibility of any President since Zach-
ary Taylor to occupy the office). 
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gests that the case law is less than overwhelming on this point. 
But no one can plausibly believe that Downes was decided as a 
detached, dispassionate exegesis of prior opinions. The doctrine 
of "unincorporated territories," one may confidently assert, was 
the product, far more importantly, of the perceived exigencies of 
the moment, which made Puerto Rico and the Philippines at 
once highly desirable as possessions of the United States yet, it 
was thought, unsuitable for genuine membership in the Ameri-
can Union. I shall return to this theme presently. 
Of course, even if Puerto Rico had been treated as a full-
fledged, first-class "Territory" of the United States, that would 
still invite further discussion of the implications of the distinction 
drawn in the Constitution between States and Territories. Some 
of the ramifications are obvious and unproblematic. Only States 
can have voting representatives in Congress or representation in 
the Electoral College.27 But what about, for example, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,28 specifically limited 
in its language to "[t]he Citizens of each State." Would, then, a 
state be free to discriminate against citizens of the United States 
who were not, however, citizens of any particular state, i.e., those 
citizens of the United States living in territories, at least in the 
absence of Equal Protection limitations.29 New Hampshire 
might have to allow Vermonters to become members of its bar, 
but does this extend to domiciliaries of Puerto Rico or the Virgin 
Islands?30 And§ 4 of Article IV guarantees "a Republican Form 
of Government" only to "every State in this Union," 31 just as the 
United States apgarently must protect only "each of them 
against Invasion." Can the United States blithely govern, in-
definitely, any Territory in a decidedly non-Republican manner 
27. The District of Columbia, which is not a state, does have representation in the 
College (and, like Puerto Rico, non-voting representation in the House of Representa-
tives), but it took a constitutional amendment, see U.S. Const., Amend. XXIII, to gain 
the electoral votes enjoyed by the District. 
28. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
citizens in the several States." 
29. See Supreme Coun of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). 
30. I note that Thorstenn v. Barnard, 842 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd 489 U.S. 
546 (1989), held that the Privileges and Immunities Oause was applicable to the Virgin 
Islands and, therefore, invalidated the Islands' residency requirement, but this still 
doesn't seem to dispose of the reverse problem, where a Virgin Islander, though a citizen 
of the United States, is not a citizen of "a State." 
31. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legisla-
ture cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." 
32. ld. (emphasis added). 
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and cite the text of Article IV as licensing such governance? 
This is, of course, no idle question, not only in regard to territo-
ries like Puerto Rico and Guam but also with regard to the Dis-
trict of Columbia, which continues in basic ways to be under the 
iron fist of a Congress in which it has no voting representation.33 
Surely one task of any first-year constitutional law course is to 
teach the techniques of close textual analysis, including the im-
portance of reading the Constitution in its entirety and discern-
ing from the language used in one part implications for analysis 
of other parts.34 
All of these pedagogical goals are amply furthered by 
Downes. Yet, in all candor, my own interest in adding it to the 
syllabus or my zeal in urging that other teachers do likewise, 
comes less from its potential utility as part of the pedagogical 
canon than from its importance for those interested in con-
structing the best cultural-literacy canon, which goes to creating 
citizens who are well informed about key episodes in American 
constitutional development or, indeed, for the value it would 
have within the academic theory canon in directing constitu-
tional scholars toward important questions that have tended to 
be ignored within contemporary scholarship. 
The culturally literate citizen should be aware of the par-
ticularities of American expansionism found in the late 19th cen-
tury, on which The Insular Cases throw immense light. Earlier 
moments of expansionism- the move Westward, in the name of 
what would be denominated "Manifest Destiny,"35 toward the 
Pacific as evoked so powerfully in Marshall's opinion in McCul-
loch36 -involved lands that were clearly meant to become, after 
33. See e.g., Francis X. Clines, $1.64 May Block Medical Use of Marijuana in Capital, 
N.Y. Times A22 (Nov. 13, 1998), which details the attempt by Congress to prevent the District 
of Columbia from counting the ballots in an initiative about the medical use of marijuana in 
what is described as an "11th-hour move to void the Nov. 3 marijuana initiative by passing an 
appropriations amendment that bars the city from spending even the smallest amount of money 
to tally and promulgate the result." Clines refers to this episode as part of "this city's perennial 
home-rule struggle with Congress." (It would, apparently, cost only about $1.64 to push the 
computer button that would tally the results.) 
34. This methodology is probably most identified these days with Akhil Reed 
Amar. Indeed, Amar draws on The Insular Cases in his recent article, lntratextualism, 
112 Harv. L. Rev. 747,782-88 (1999) (discussing varying approaches of C. C. Langdell and 
A. Lawrence Lowell in their articles on the constitutional status of Puerto Rico). 
35. See, e.g., Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History 
(1963). 
36. "Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are to be 
marched and supported. . . . . Is that construction of the constitution to be preferred, 
which would render these operations difficult, hazardous and expensive?" 17 U.S. (4 
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settlement and development by whites, full members of the 
United States of America, with concomitant full rights of par-
ticipation in the House, Senate, and electoral college. Perma-
nent colonization was not viewed as "the American way," save, 
of course, for American Indians, whose story- also, one might 
note, excluded from the current canon of constitutional law-is 
vital to any narrative of American expansionism and whose legal 
history is linked in important ways to that of the Puerto Ricans 
whose fate is ultimately at issue in Downes. 
What I now realize, in a way that was simply not part of my 
consciousness prior to my immersion in Downes, is how much 
the entire story of American expansionism has been ignored 
within the currently operative canon(s) of constitutional law. 
The central narratives of American constitutional history tend to 
be those sketched out in Robert McCloskey's classic work The 
American Supreme Court/1 which features three organizing 
story-lines: The first describes the complex (and, of course, ulti-
mately violent) grappling with the implications of federalism, a 
story that begin with the 1787 drafting of the Constitution and 
lasts at least until Appomatox. At that point, although the issue 
of federalism obviously does not disappear, it moves to the 
background, to be replaced in the starring role by the constitu-
tional issues generated by the development of industrial capital-
ism and a national economy. To what extent will government, 
both at the state and national levels, be deemed to have the 
power to regulate the new forms of business enterprise that had 
developed? This legal struggle, of course, culminated in the New 
Deal Revolution that removed the doctrinal obstacles that had 
been created by the "Old Court" in the earlier half-century. 
Again, issues of economic regulation have not entirely disap-
peared, but they, too, have moved substantially into the shad-
ows, as the central story shifts to the Constitution's role as guar-
antor of the civil rights and liberties of vulnerable minorities, 
what might be termed the "footnote 4" narrative featuring the 
Court as vigorous protector of the politically and socially down-
Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819). Professor LaRue aptly describes the basic rhetoric of McCul-
loch as "The Story of Growth," see Lewis H. LaRue, Constitutional Law as Fiction: Nar-
rative in the Rhetoric of Authority 90 (Penn. State U. Press, 1995). The "growth" in-
volved is not only that of the Court (or even of the Constitution as a regulator of state or 
national politics), but also of the Nation itself. 
37. Robert McOoskey, The American Supreme Court (U. of Chicago Press, 1960). 
I have prepared an updated version of this book, which was published in 1994. It did not, 
however, revise any of McOoskey's original analysis. 
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trodden.38 Or, as I have suggested in my own reVIsiOns to 
McCloskey's text, the post-Great Society Court has taken on the 
task of monitoring the operation of the significantly enlarged 
welfare state that emerged in the 1960s.39 What is notably absent 
from McCloskey's account-and, of course, the point is that he is 
not in the least unique-is the epic story of American expan-
sionism that pervades our entire 19th-century history.40 
The Insular Cases, of course, deal with one important epi-
sode in the history of expansionism, the aftermath of the Span-
ish-American War of 1898 that represented, among other things, 
the forthright decision by American ruling elites-and the elec-
torate in the 1900 presidential contest between William McKin-
ley and William Jennings Bryan-to join European countries in 
becoming a frankly imperialist power. This meant, among other 
things, the capture and subsequent politico-legal control by the 
United States of hitherto foreign territory that would not, in any 
way, be viewed as a potential member of the organic entity 
known as The United States of America. But one of the mar-
velous things about Downes, pedagogically speaking, is that it 
contains within it a capsule history of some other crucial chap-
ters in the expansionist saga. 
The most important example surely involves the Louisiana 
Purchase.41 Students can learn from Downes of Thomas Jeffer-
38. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). An 
especially interesting account of the jurisprudence of Footnote Four is J.M. Balkin, The 
Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 275 (1989). I do not want to be read as necessarily endorsing 
the descriptive accuracy of the standard narrative and its tendency to praise the Court as 
a fearless protector of the downtrodden. My colleague Lucas Powe challenges this con-
ventional wisdom in The Warren Coun and American Politics (Harvard U. Press, 2000), 
which argues that even this Court most esteemed by political liberals scarcely proved 
particularly protective of truly vulnerable minorities (i.e., those minorities who did not 
enjoy significant support from the wider polity). 
39. See McOoskey, The American Supreme Court 174 (revised by S. Levinson, U. 
of Chicago Press, 1994}. 
40. Helen Hershkoff has suggested that American expansionism might well be part 
of the story of political economy, including the state's attempts to regulate (and, of 
course, to promote) capitalism. And, insofar as The Insular Cases arise at the very height 
of McOoskey's second period, they might especially warrant being woven into the epic 
story of the relationship between capital and government. Helen Hershkoff to Sanford 
Levinson, Feb. 3, 2000. Although I am in general sympathy with Prof. Hershkoffs point, 
an anomoly of the absorption of Puerto Rico is that it is harder to explain in terms of 
classic economic imperialism than is , say, the rather ruthless takeover of the formally 
independent monarchy of Hawaii during the same period. 
41. This, too, now appears in the new edition of Processes of Constitutional Deci-
sionmaking at 73-75 (cited in note 9). Can anyone seriously question that the decision to 
go ahead with the Purchase was of far more significance, both politically and constitu-
tionally, than Marbury and, probably, any single one of the "great cases': linked with the 
Marshall period? Put it this way: Marshall only talked about the Amencan empue that 
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son's belief that the Louisiana Purchase was unconstitutional, 
though this was quite irrelevant to his decision to go ahead with 
the decision that fundamentally transformed the Union and put 
in place, because of the existence of vast new territories to be 
settled by Americans moving westward, the issue that would ul-
timately trigger dissolution and conflagration in 1861. At one 
level, Jefferson's skepticism is probably known to most reasona-
bly well-informed students of American history. But most peo-
ple, I dare say, assume that the only problem involved presiden-
tial authority to commit the United States to the purchase of 
foreign territory prior to congressional authorization. That, to 
be sure, was no small issue, but, at the end of the day, it was far 
from the far more profound problem, which indeed involved the 
radical transformation generated by the Purchase in the very na-
ture of the United States as a socio-political entity. 
Most obviously, it greatly increased the size of the United 
States, more than doubling it. This could be no small point for 
anyone at all committed to the classical republican belief that 
republican government could not be successfully achieved in an 
"extended" territory. This was, of course, the subject of a classic 
essay by James Madison in The Federalist, 42 which displayed little 
patience for the small-area theory of republicanism espoused by 
many anti-Federalists. But Madison's argument was written to 
justify what from our own perspective is a remarkably modest 
extended republic of thirteen states (and attached territories that 
would be ceded to the new United States as the seedbed for ex-
pansion west of the Alleghenies) consisting of approximately 3 
million people, the majority of whom (or, more to the point, the 
overwhelming majority of the people permitted to participate in 
the polity) were white, Protestant, and English-speaking. It re-
quires a substantial leap of faith to assume that even Madisoni-
ans, let alone Jeffersonians fearful of potential tyranny from an 
impersonal government far removed from local networks, would 
necessarily applaud a vastly larger country, the most important 
city of which, New Orleans, was dominated by French-speaking 
Catholics whose legal elites were untrained in the mysteries of 
the common law. Indeed, the Orleans legislature in March, 
1808, signified the triumph of the civilian over the common law-
existed in 1819 (and perhaps he envisioned a greater one to come), whereas Jefferson 
had actually made it happen (and his Democratic successors would be the heartiest sup-
porters of future expansionism). 
42. See The Federalist No. 14 (James Madison) at 150 (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., 
Harvard U. Press, 1961). 
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yer's sensibility by adopting the Digest of the Civil Laws Now in 
Force in the Territory of Orleans, modeled on the Code Napo-
leon, which to this day informs at least some legal practice in 
Louisiana.43 And, of course, it could readily be predicted that 
many of the new lands would be conducive to the expansion of 
slavery and, just as importantly, the creation of new states com-
mitted to maintaining (and expanding) chattel slavery; the ex-
plicit terms of the Purchase seemed to guarantee the eventual 
(but not too-long deferred) admission as full-fledged, and equal, 
states of the territories that would be carved out of the Purchase. 
It is little wonder that Jefferson believed that a constitu-
tional amendment was necessary to justify the expansion instan-
tiated in the Louisiana Purchase. "Our Confederation is cer-
tainly confined," he wrote John Dickinson, a fellow signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, "to the limits established by the 
revolution. The general government has no powers but such as 
the constitution has given it; and it has not given it a power of 
holding foreign territory, and still less of incorporating it into the 
Union. An amendment of the constitution seems necessary for 
this. "44 Ironically enough, his Federalist opponents professed to 
43. See George Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Tradi-
tions 156-57 (Harvard U. Press, 1975). It is indicative of the complexities of New Or-
leans' colonial past that Spanish courts exercised jurisdiction over New Orleans until No-
vember 30, 1803, when the Territory was retroceded from Spain to France (and then, on 
December 20, transferred to the United States). The French prefect, though abolishing 
the existing Spanish courts, did not put in their place French substitutes, presumably be-
cause of the short time remaining during which France would exercise even formal sov-
ereignty. This in turn led to an extensive debate about the proper legal system for Lou-
isiana. Although Jefferson was an ardent believer in a uniform legal system, id. at 107, he 
was notably unsuccessful in substituting Anglo-Saxon common law for the existing conti-
nental approach to law. The local legislature passed in May 1806 a bill declaring "the 
civil law in force and projecting a Spanish code," but it was vetoed by the Governor. ld. 
at 116. Needless to say, English-speaking settlers had little sympathy for attempts of the 
French-speaking community to maintain the traditional legal ways. Finally, after much 
debate (and recrimination), the Orleans legislature, on March 31, 1808, adopted the Di-
gest. 
George Dargo concludes his interesting book on the controversy by writing: 
Louisiana saw the exercise of American cultural and political imperialism, but it 
was also a kind of model of how that imperial thrust was once partially blunted. 
As a result of the Louisiana encounter, the new American nation was com-
pelled to elevate the level of tolerance it was willing to display toward a foreign 
population caught in its midst. 
Id. at 174. 
How much tolerance would necessarily be shown toward "foreign" populations 
caught up in the expansionist epic would, of course, remain to be seen. At the very least, 
though, Drago usefully captures the sense in which the aftermath of the Louisiana Pur-
chase can be understood as an exercise in applied "multiculturalism." 
44. Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, quoted in David N. Mayer, The Constitu-
tional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, 247 (U. Press of Virginia, 1994). See generally 
Everett Somerville Brown, The Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803-
2000] SYMPOSIUM: LEVINSON 255 
share such constitutional doubts, presumably because of the ob-
vious increase in Southern power presaged by the Purchase. 
Obviously, Jefferson changed his mind, not least because of what 
Holmes would well label "the felt necessities of the times." If 
the United States appeared to tarry in taking advantage of Na-
poleon's remarkable offer, there was a danger that Spain would 
attempt to undo the deal, to the severe detriment of American 
national interests.45 There is, therefore, no amendment licensing 
the purchase, and executive-congressional power under the 
treaty clause was expanded in a coup d'main. Even more to the 
point, this champion of strict construction and constitutional fi-
delity wrote one correspondent that "whatever congress shall 
think it necessary to do, should be done with as little debate as 
possible, & particularly so far as respects the constitutional diffi-
culty," while another was told that "the less that is said about the 
constitutional difficulties, the better."46 His most famous ration-
alization of the Purchase is surely his 1810 letter to John Colvin, 
in which Jefferson explained that "A strict observance of the 
written law is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen 
but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-
preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher 
obligation."47 Even if one agrees with Jefferson, it remains well 
worth asking precisely how salvation of the country required the 
Purchase (or the other expansionist acts that would be carried 
out with questionable constitutional provenance). In any event, 
the Louisiana Purchase is a wonderful topic for considering the 
varied imperatives that must be considered by any president, and 
we must ultimately confront the question whether we care about 
Jefferson's (in)fidelity to the Constitution any more than we care 
about whether the Philadelphia framers and the later ratifiers 
were really faithful to the Articles of Confederation or, in a per-
haps more volatile example, whether the supporters of the Four-
teenth Amendment paid due heed to the requirements of Article 
v. 
Downes also contains extensive discussions of Chief Justice 
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott. 48 For understandable reasons, the 
case is usually treated, when it is found at all in canonical mate-
1812 (U. of California Press, 1920). 
45. ld. at 250. 
46. Both quoted in Mayer, The Constitutiorwl Thought of Thomas Jefferson at 230 
(cited in note 44). 
47. Quoted in Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the 1dea of a Republican 
Government 34 (Stanford U. Press, 1970). 
48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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rials,49 as a case only about slavery and, even more so, about the 
status of Blacks, deemed by Taney to have "no rights which the 
white man was bound to respect."50 With the demise of slav-
ery-and the solution to the problem of citizenship provided by 
the first sentence of the Fourteenth-Dred Scott is thought to be 
a case with little "gravitational weight" in the Dworkinian sense. 
But the meta-issue, as it were, of Dred Scott, is whether Congress 
possesses "plenary," i.e., unconstrained, power in regard to the 
territories of the United States, and no issue, obviously, was 
more relevant at the turn of the 20th century. 
Taney's conclusion that Congress did not enjoy plenary 
power rendered unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise of 
1820, with its prohibition of slavery in the northern regions of 
the Louisiana Purchase. Although Article N gives Congress the 
power to make "all needful rules" (emphasis added), it takes 
only minimal acquaintance with the issues surrounding the exe-
gesis of the "necessary and proper" clause to realize that this can 
easily be read as considerably less than an assignment of plenary 
power to Congress to do whatever it thinks desirable concerning 
the territories. To speak somewhat anachronistically, Taney can 
be viewed as a "premature anti-imperialist" who rejected the no-
tion of the United States as a country that could conquer terri-
tory and govern it indefinitely at the behest of Congress. In-
stead, for Taney, all territory was in effect held in trust for those 
Americans who would settle it and then establish full and equal 
States within the American polity. And, while in the territory, 
they maintained a full set of constitutional rights. To be anach-
ronistic once more, Taney would presumably have answered yes 
to the question surrounding The Insular Cases: Does the Consti-
tution follow the flag? It is a useful exercise to ask whether Ta-
ney was wrong in his entire theory of the case, or "only" in the 
absolutely disastrous application of his theory to protect the 
purported property rights of slaveowners. 
To be sure, Downes does not present a comprehensive 
overview of American expansionism. There is, for example, no 
discussion of the significant constitutional issues surrounding the 
annexation of Texas51 (perhaps because the Lone Star Republic 
was never a "territory" of the United States). Anyone inter-
ested, though, in the meaning of the Treaty Clause as a signifi-
49. As a matter of fact, Dred Scott just barely hangs on to canonical status. See 
Sanford Levinson, 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. at 1087, 1090-91 (cited in note 1). 
50. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
51. See Frederick Merk, Slavery and the Annexation of Texas 121-51 (Knopf, 1972). 
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cant procedural hurdle to foreign entanglements should certainly 
be interested in the rather remarkable process surrounding 
Texas's entry into the union. The annexation of Texas was first 
presented to the Senate in the form of a treaty between two sov-
ereigns, requiring ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. How-
ever, upon the realization of the impossibility of securing such 
support, given the antagonism of anti-slavery northerners to this 
boon to slaveowners, the admission of Texas as a State was 
transformed into ordinary legislation admitting a new State, 
which requires only the approval of a majority of each House of 
Congress. The fact that all prior states were carved out of terri-
tory belonging to the United States was deemed constitutionally 
irrelevant. Downes is also silent on the particular history of the 
United States in relation to conquered tribes of American Indi-
ans. All of these are parts of the expansionist epic, and all de-
serve placement that is now lacking in the canon. 
The Insular Cases should be placed not only in the context 
of American expansionism, but also within the sadly rich history 
of American racism or, perhaps more to the point, the history of 
American "ascriptivism," the view that to be a "true American," 
one had to share certain racial, religious, or ethnic characteris-
tics.52 No one can read Downes without realizing the extent to 
which the "unAmericanness" of the people in the new American 
territories is fundamental to the outcome. Thus Justice Brown, 
denying that Puerto Rico is within the United States, notes the 
implications of a contrary decision for "what Chief Justice Mar-
shall termed the 'American empire.' There seems to be no mid-
dle ground between [Brown's] position and the doctrine that if 
their inhabitants do not become, immediately upon annexation, 
citizens of the United States, [then at least] their children there-
after born, whether savages or civilized, are such, and entitled to 
all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens. "53 This was, 
apparently, unthinkable. Yet there was no doubt in Brown's 
mind that annexation of what he termed "outlying and distant"54 
lands might serve American national (and imperial) interests. 
52. See generally Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in 
U.S. History (Yale U. Press, 1997). Smith notes, for example, the presence of an influen-
tial ideology, especially prevalent during the period of The Insular Cases, that "America 
was by rights a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation in which true Americans were 
native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors." Id. at 3. Smith specifically discusses the 
treatment of Puerto Rico (and Puerto Ricans) at 438-39. 
53. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,279 (1901) (emphasis added). 
54. Id. at 282 
258 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:241 
If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing 
from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation and 
modes of thought, the administration of government and jus-
tice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles [presumably instan-
tiated in the Constitution], may for a time be impossible; and 
the question at once arises whether large concessions ought 
not to be made for a time, that ultimately our own theories 
may be carried out, and the blessings of a free government 
under the Constitution extended to them. 55 
It is almost needless to add that Justice Brown authored the 
egregious opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,56 which can be under-
stood only against a background assumption that it was entirely 
reasonable for racially superior whites to wish to avoid the pros-
pect of association as presumptive social equals with African-
Americans. Students should realize that these cases arise out of 
a common intellectual milieu. Similarly, cases at the time in-
volving American Indians featured similar assumptions. Thus 
the Court in Elk v. Wilkins57 had refused to recognize American 
Indians as birthright citizens.58 For certain purposes, then, In-
dian lands were also viewed as not being within the United 
States, though, of course, this had no effect on the extent of the 
governing authority Congress would claim vis-a-vis the Indian 
nations.59 And, in a 1913 decision, a unanimous Court described 
the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico as "adhering to primitive 
modes of life, . . . and chiefly governed according to the crude 
customs inherited from their ancestors[;] they are essentially a 
simple, uninformed and inferior people," thus much in need of 
"special consideration and protection, like other Indian commu-
nities. "60 
One ought, of course, not treat the Court as some kind of 
deviation from an otherwise more enlightened universalism 
found in the other branches, for that was surely not the case. 
55. Id. at 287. 
56. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
57. 112 u.s. 94 (1884}. 
58. I should note the genuine political (as well as constitutional) complexities of the 
issue. One may well think that Elk, which involved an American Indian who clearly 
wished to assimilate, was wrongly decided without at the same time necessarily endol'liing 
the view that American citizenship should automatically have attached, say, to any Sioux 
born in the Dakota Territory or Montana. The reason is simple: There is no reason to 
believe that all Indians wished to be American citizens (anymore, say, than West Bank 
Palestinians would view absorption into Israel, with Israeli citizenship, as acceptable). 
59. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (enunciation of the plenary 
power doctrine in regard to congressional power to regulate tribes). 
60. United Srates v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28,39 (1913). 
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Congress was, during this era, passing laws excluding the immi-
gration of Asians.61 Indeed, Justice Harlan, in his famous dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, after arguing that "the destinies of the two 
races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together," went on 
to note, alluding to "the Chinese race," that " [ t ]here is a race so 
different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to 
it to become citizens of the United States."62 Lest one believe 
this is simply an empirical description of existing law, even more 
telling- and shocking to those for whom Harlan has become an 
icon of anti-racist sensibility-is his joining in Chief Justice 
Fuller's dissent in United States v. Wong Kim Ark.63 The major-
ity had held that persons of Chinese descent born in the United 
States were indeed birthright citizens under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Fuller and Harlan, on the other hand, accepted 
the argument made by the United States that "[t]here certainly 
should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that 
would be sacred from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing 
alienage."64 Fuller, joined by Harlan, agreed and denounced 
"the presence within our territory of large numbers of Chinese 
laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in 
the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to 
the customs and usage of their own country, unfamiliar with our 
institutions and apparently incapable of assimilating with our 
people. "65 It can, then, occasion no surprise that they were not 
willing to admit "that the children of persons so situated become 
citizens by the accident of birth. "66 
I may be misleading the reader insofar as I have framed the 
issue as one of "plenary congressional authority" versus "posses-
sion of constitutional rights" (i.e., "the Constitution following 
the flag"). As a matter of fact, the two plurality opinions that 
constitute the Court's response to questions about Puerto Rico's 
status both reject the suggestion that Congress possesses truly 
"plenary" -i.e., constitutionally unfettered-power over the ter-
61. Upheld in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
u.s. 581 (1889). 
62. 163 u.s. 537,561 (1896). 
63. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth· Justice 
Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 151 (1996). 
64. Brief for the United States at 37, reprinted in Philip Kurland and Gerhard 
Casper, eds., 14 Landmark Briefs And Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Constitutional Law 37 (U. Publications of An!erica, 1975). 
65. 169 U.S. at 731 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 717 
(1893) (Fuller, C.J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. 
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ritories.67 Thus Justice Brown distinguished between constitu-
tional "prohibitions as go to the very root of the power of Con-
gress to act at all, irrespective of time and place, and such as are 
operative only 'throughout the United States' or among the sev-
eral States."68 Thus he suggests that Congress could not grant ti-
tles of nobility in the territories any more than in the rest of the 
United States.69 More interesting is his somewhat cryptic com-
ment that "[p]erhaps, the same remark may apply to the First 
Amendment ... ," though he quickly adds that "[w]e do not wish, 
however, to be understood as expressing an opinion how far the 
bill of rights contained in the first eight amendments is of gen-
eral and how far of local application. "70 Later in the opinion 
Brown distinguishes "between certain natural rights enforced in 
the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with them, 
and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights which are 
peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence."71 As examples of 
the former, he offers 
the rights to one's own religious opinions and to a public ex-
pression of them, or, as sometimes said, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of one's own conscience; the right to 
personal liberty and individual property; to freedom of speech 
and of the press; to free access to courts of justice, to due pro-
cess of law and to an equal protection of the laws; to immuni-
ties from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as cruel 
and unusual punishments; and to such other immunities as are 
indispensable to a free government.72 
The latter, "artificial rights," include "rights to citizenship, 
to suffrage . . . and to the particular methods of procedure 
pointed out in the Constitution, which are peculiar to Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence." 73 It should not occasion surprise, then, 
that the Court, in 1922, held that Puerto Ricans, though by then 
admitted to citizenship by act of Congress, were not entitled to 
67. I am grateful to Larry Sager for pressing this point with me. He uses the 
Court's language, quoted in this and the following paragraphs, to support the proposition 
that the plurality opinions, though concededly containing some troublesome language, 
can also be read as vindicating of the roles of both the Constitution and the Court as 
guarantors of (at least some measure of) liberty for all. 
68. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,277 (1901). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. (emphasis added). 
71. Id. at 282 
72. Id. at 282-83. See, for a more modern restatement of the same basic point, Ex-
amining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599 n.30 (1976): only '"fundamental' 
constitutional rights [are] guaranteed to the inhabitants" of unincorporated territories. 
73. Id. at 283. 
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trial by jury, though, interestingly enough, residents of Alaska 
had been held in 1905 to enjoy such a right.74 Nor, of course, is it 
likely that any Court would deem the citizens of an "unincorpo-
rated territory" as possessing the "right to keep and carry arms 
wherever they went" which Taney, in Dred Scott, agpeared to 
view as one of the hallmarks of American citizenship. 
The basis of the distinction between Alaskans and Puerto 
Ricans was the doctrine of "unincorporated" territories enunci-
ated in Justice White's plurality opinion, though White agrees 
that "there are general prohibitions in the Constitution in favor 
of the liberty and property of the citizen which are not mere 
regulations as to the form and manner in which a conceded 
power may be exercised, but which are an absolute denial of all 
authority under any circumstances or conditions to do particular 
acts."76 Even if one ignores the limitation of these protections to 
"the citizen," it should remain clear that Downes is (or should 
be) almost literally a textbook example of how members of the 
Court came to consider themselves authorized to pick and 
choose among constitutional norms on the basis of notions of 
importance or "fundamentality." 
Lest one be too critical of this, one should note the implica-
tions for a legal doctrine that takes "multiculturalism" seriously. 
That is, it is debatable what constitutional norms must be univer-
salised (even within the territorial boundaries of jurisdictions 
controlled by the United States) and how many of them should 
indeed be viewed and expressive only of "local" or, in Justice 
Brown's word, "particular" norms. It is hard to argue, for exam-
ple, that trial by jury does constitute some kind of "fundamen-
tal" human right; most legal cultures reject it or, at the very least, 
use juries far less than does the United States. The same varia-
tion may be seen, of course, with regard to important aspects of 
what we see as "First Amendment" issues, such as, say, the 
regulation of "hate speech" or commercial advertising. 
Nor, if one is to be honest, can one simply dismiss as irrele-
vant the questions asked by Justice Brown, even if they are 
phrased in a decidedly odious manner. Only the most naive, and 
indeed chauvinistic, American could believe that our particular 
Constitution is a one-size-fits-all model of how all societies, 
74. Compare Balzac v. People of Pono Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), with Rasmussen 
v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). 
75. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,417 (1857). 
76. Downes, 182 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added). 
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whatever their particular histories, social structures, traditions, 
or state of economic development, should be governed. One 
must recognize that to this day Puerto Ricans are scarcely undi-
vided in regard to the basic issue underlying The Insular Cases, 
i.e., the complete absorption of the island into "the United 
States." A (slim) majority of Puerto Ricans, after all, reject 
statehood in favor of alternatives, either retention of common-
wealth status or independence, that presuppose a certain lack of 
"fit," as it were, between full membership in the Union, with all 
attendant constitutional obligations, and the particular interests 
of Puerto Rico. Moreover, to this day the Constitution does not 
truly follow the flag in regard to Indian nations within the terri-
torial United States. The Bill of Rights has never been formally 
"incorporated" against Indian nations, and even the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, which extends most of the protections of the Bill of 
Rights to members of Indian tribes, nonetheless omits the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment.77 Indian nations 
are thus allowed to be theocracies in a way that would be wholly 
impermissible in any other institution of American governance. 
It is also worth paying attention to the politics of statehood 
in regard to the New Mexico and Arizona territories, which were 
very much affected by concerns about the prevalence of Spanish-
speaking Mexican-Americans in the former. An initial proposal 
that New Mexico and Arizona be admitted together as one state 
was rejected in a "Protest" by the Arizona territorial legislature, 
which referred to "the decided racial difference between the 
people of New Mexico, who are not only different in race and 
largely in language, but have entirely different customs, laws and 
ideals and would have but little prospect of successful amalga-
mation." Describing the people of Arizona, the Protest stated 
that "95 percent ... are Americans," which suggest an unwill-
ingness to treat most of their fellow American citizens in New 
Mexico as "real" Americans because of these differences.78 The 
good news, of course, is that New Mexico was in fact admitted to 
the Union in 1912, with Arizona as a separate state, but the con-
cern about difference, especially of language, has certainly not 
disappeared. Indeed, any discussion of the prospects of Puerto 
77. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). As to the Indian Ovil Rights Act, see 
Robert N. Ointon, Nell Jessup Newton, and Monroe E. Price, American Indian Law 384-
85 (Michie, 3d ed. 1991). 
78. The Protest is quoted in "Language Rights and New Mexico Statehood," in 
James Crawford, ed., Language Loyalties: A Source Book on the Official English Contro-
versy 59 (U. of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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Rican statehood today quickly turns to the fact that most Puerto 
Ricans speak only (or, certainly, principally) Spanish and that 
Puerto Rico, if a state, might take advantage of the "equal 
footing doctrine"79 to emulate other states who have declared an 
"official" language,~ though in Puerto Rico's case the official 
language would presumably be Spanish. 
In any event, I suggest the following thought experiment: 
Imagine that a majority of Puerto Ricans vote to petition Con-
gress for admission to the Union as a State. What proper rea-
sons could Congress give to deny that request? That most 
Puerto Ricans are non-white? That they are Catholic? That 
they are poor? That they do not speak English? That admission 
as a state would "dilute" the voting power of the present states 
in the Senate and, if the House were not expanded, in the House 
as well? Few scholars remain active who remember the politics 
of admission with regard to Alaska and Hawaii. It is not at all 
unthinkable that even those of us who are now (relative) "old-
timers" will be able to observe (and even to offer advice) on the 
admission of Puerto Rico. 
Few cases, then, offer so much as Downes in learning about 
the interplay of general American political ideologies and the 
development of constitutional doctrine. Moreover, insofar as 
the lessons are sometimes unpleasant, Downes can serve as an 
important corrective against some of the more cheerleading 
views of constitutional history (and the Supreme Court) as nec-
essarily progressive in its thrust. 
I have ignored so far the third canon, those paradigm cases 
(or non-judicial episodes) that constitute the subject matter for 
those academics who are self-consciously engaging in the enter-
prise of constitutional theory. Here, too, The Insular Cases am-
ply pay their way, especially if one agrees with such leading fig-
ures as Bruce Ackerman81 and Stephen Griffin82 that the duty of 
the constitutional theorist is to explain the actual mechanisms of 
constitutional change that have undoubtedly occurred in the 
American polity. Both sharply reject the altogether nai've-in-
deed, literally incredible-notion that the Constitution over the 
79. On "equal footing," see Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504,514-15 (1896). 
80. See, e.g., Crawford, Language Loyalties at 132-35 (cited in note 78), for the 
texts of nine such declarations from various states. 
81. See generally Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 
1991); We the People: Transformations (Belknap Press, 1998). 
82. See Stephen Griffin, American Constitutionalism· From Theory to Politics 
(Princeton U. Press, 1995). 
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past 200 years can be understood in terms of a canonical text 
drafted in 1787 plus those written textual additions we call 
"amendments" and "interpretations" of these canonical texts 
proffered by the Supreme Court. Both argue, and I strongly 
agree, that significant "amendment" has taken place outside the 
confines of Article V. 83 
Ackerman, of course, is famous for his notion of "constitu-
tional moments," whereby an aroused American public, con-
fronting issues of great import, make a conscious decision to 
strike out on transformative constitutional paths. Although his 
initial writings suggested that there were only three such mo-
ments-the Founding in 1787, Reconstruction immediately after 
1865, and then the New Deal-his more recent work has ac-
knowledged the possibility of additional such moments. Indeed, 
Ackerman has recognized that his own earlier work was too 
much focused on domestic events; a book co-authored with 
David Golove, on the other hand, argues that an important les-
son of World War II was the inutility of the Treaty Clause as a 
constraint on foreign agreements, so that broad notions of "ex-
ecutive agreement," coupled with majority approval of both 
houses of Congress, in effect substituted for the far more oner-
ous reauirement of the Treaty Clause (shades of Texas annexa-
. ') st t10n .. 
It is, I think, easy to view The Insular Cases as the product 
of just such an Ackermanian "moment." Although historians 
differ on the extent to which the Election of 1900 was a referen-
dum on American imperialism,85 it is clear that the 1898 War and 
its aftermath was one of the central issues placed before the 
public. The two sides could hardly have been more clear in their 
views, the Republican McKinley embracing the duty to "educate 
the Filipinos [and, presumably, Puerto Ricans], and uplift and 
civilize and Christianize them,"86 while William Jennings Bryan 
83. See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution 
Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, 
in Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Con-
stitutional Amendment 13 (Princeton U. Press, 1995). 
84. See generally Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFT A Constitutional? 
(Harvard U. Press, 1995). 
85. See Thomas A. Bailey, Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Im-
perialism?," 24 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 43 (1937), discussed in Owen M. Fiss, 8 History of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-
1910 at 229 (Macmillan, 1993). Fiss has an excellent chapter focusing on The Insular 
Cases, id. at 225-56. 
86. Quoted in Fiss, History of the Supreme Court at 227 n.5 (cited in note 85) 
(quoting James F. Rhodes, The Mckinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909 at 
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pressed the anti-imperialist cause. McKinley obviously won, and 
The Insular Cases decided accordingly. It was, indeed, these 
cases that generated Finley Peter Dunne's immortal aphorism, 
"no matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' 
Supreme Coort [sic] follows th' iliction returns."87 For many, this 
is a cynical observation. For Ackerman, though, following the 
election returns, at least when the electorate has been properly 
primed by political leaders as to what is at stake, is precisely 
what the Supreme Court should do in order to recognize the 
successful culmination of a constitutional moment. The impor-
tance of Ackerman's argument, relative to The Insular Cases, is 
this: Even if one concedes the validity of the dissenters' analysis 
that the distinction between "incorporated" and "unincorpo-
rated" territories is made up of whole cloth and that Taney was 
basically correct in his anti-imperialist (albeit, in this instance, 
pro-slavery) reading of the initial Constitution, the Constitution 
had in effect been amended as the result of the events of 1898 
and the ratifying election that took place two years later. Thus 
the majority was perhaps right on the merits, though not for the 
reasons they gave. 
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, this essay should be regarded as a "brief," 
making the case for inclusion of Downes v. Bidwell (and, 
through it, the more general saga of American expansionism) 
into the various canons of American constitutional law. Its in-
tended audience is by no means the already well-informed 
scholar, such as Alex Alenikoffl or Gerald Neuman,89 who have 
long been aware of the importance of the case and the broader 
issues surrounding it and who have tried, with extremely limited 
success, to educate the rest of us.~nstead, I am writing for those 
106-07 (Macmillan, 1922)). 
87. Quoted in Fiss, History of the Supreme Coun at 229 (cited in note 85). 
88. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Pueno Rico and the Constitution: Conun-
drums and Prospects, II Const. Comm. 15 (1994)1 see also Gary Lawson, Territorial Govern-
ments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 853 (1990). 
89. See generally Gerald Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Bor-
ders, and Fundamental Law (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
90. I am also informed by my NYU colleague Helen Hershkoff that she teaches 
The Insular Cases in her Federal Courts class. "Together with McCulloch and the Lou-
isiana Purchase, I regard them as integral to what has come to be called a functional, as 
opposed to formalist, approach to separation of powers. I enlist the insular cases in 
teaching a number of topics, including Congressional control of jurisdiction; the estab-
lishment of Article I courts and agency structure; and the relation between the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine and structural protections." Helen Hershkoff to Sanford 
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readers like myself, sadly underinformed about the case and its 
profound implications. I hope that I have said enough to whet 
their (or, more accurately, your) own appetites and to encourage 
the welcoming of Downes and linked materials into the various 
canons of American constitutional inquiry. If not, then I hope, 
at the very least, to have encouraged a more explicit discussion 
of what does explain the construction of our casebooks and syl-
labi beyond the decision simply to keep presenting the materials 
that one studied in one's own law school education. 
Levinson, Feb. 3, 2000. 
